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Abstract: 
 
In our paper we argue that, the economic stagnation of only the euro zone countries in a 
world that is growing much faster, is mainly due to the overvalued euro and the related 
austerity policy measures imposed under Berlin guidelines, The malpractices of the 
international markets, the underground currency wars between the dollar, the euro and the 
yen, are also to blame. The imposition of the euro zone as an optical currency area in totally 
different economies and without a fair political umbrella has been wrong. For Greece, it has 
been catastrophic. Between 2010- 2014, the country’s average annual GDP, declined at a 
yearly level of 4,6% and there are no signs that this will soon be reversed. The strict 
austerity policies imposed by the new “Memorandum”, will lead to more recession. In front 
of the deadlock, a structured Grexit is the proper alternative solution. This implies a 
controlled bankruptcy, suspension of debt payments and negotiations for cutting and 
extending its repayment period.  
 
During the initial negotiation days, the government must provide liquidity to the economy 
through the issuing of non-interest state bonds at a ratio of 1 : 1 in relation to the euro. 
Existing capital controls and transactions with electronic money will be helpful for the same 
cause. The next step is the issuing of the new drachma devaluated at 25-30%. In order to 
avoid hyperinflation, the amount of the new drachma produced, must not exceed a certain 
level of the M2. The euro may continue to be used as a parallel currency for a period decided 
in accordance with the result of negotiations and economic trends. Low and medium incomes 
could be increased gradually, in relation with labour productivity and GDP growth trends. 
Government spending restrictions, the combat of corruption, impunity, bureaucracy, tax 
evasion and the strengthening of productive investments, are also necessary for a healthy 
new beginning.  
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1. The Modern Greek Tragedy  
 
Greece is now leaving behind the seventh consecutive year of deep recession after its 
entrance to the euro zone in January 2002. Although this entrance was supposed to 
be for the country’s   benefit, the absolute opposite occurred. Before 2002, the 
country functioned relatively well with the drachma; it never experienced a Modern 
Greek Tragedy like today. Ever since the world war II, the Greek GDP grew at a 
satisfactory pace in relation to similar trends in other developed countries 
(Histograms 1 and 2). Even if we accept that, part of the blame for the present 
economic deadlock is due to the viciousness of the Greek political system, we must 
not forget that, the same political system, more or less, existed also in the past during 
the drachma years. Moreover in the same declivity trend, although to a lesser extend, 
Greece is followed by Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and lately by Cyprus. But the 
whole euro zone is not doing well also, as we will see below here
2
.  
 
Histogram 1. GDP growth of Greece, United Kingdom, France, Germany, USA 
between the years 1951-1979 
 
 
                                                 
2 The EU consists of 28 member countries countries and the euro zone of 19 countries noted by bold 
letters in the following list, where the first number indicates the year of entrance to the E.U. and the 
second, where it applies, the year of entrance to the eurozone: Austria (1995,1999), Belgium, 1958, 
1999, Bulgaria, 2007, Croatia, 2013, Cyprus, 2004, 2008, Czech Republic, 2004, Denmark, 1973, 
Estonia, 2004, 2011, Finland, 1995, 1999, France, 1958, 1999, Germany 1958, 1999, Greece, 1981, 002 
Hungary, 2004, Ireland, 1973, 1999, Italy, 1958, 1999, Latvia, 2004, 2014, Lithuania, 2004, 2015, 
Luxembourg, 1958, 1999, Malta, 2004, 2008, The Netherlands, 1958, 1999, Poland, 2004, Portugal, 
1986, 1999, Romania, 2007 Slovakia, 2004, 2009 Slovenia, 2004, 2007, Spain, 1986, 1999 
Sweden, 1995, United Kingdom, 1973 
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Histogram 2. GDP growth of Greece, United Kingdom, France, Germany, USA 
between the years 1981-1999 
 
 
Source:  The Pen World Tables 
      
Since 2008, the Greek GDP dropped to more than 27% and this dramatic fall has no 
parallel in modern times (Histogram 3). During the same period, the country’s Stock 
Market lost more than 55% of its value. Official uunemployment climbed to 25-26% 
and over 50% for the young. The risk of poverty for people aged 18-64 years is 
estimated at 45.8%. (ELSTAT 2015). Hundreds of thousands of desperate people, 
mainly young, are fleeing abroad in search for a job. Despite extreme austerity 
measures and the haircut of 2011 (PSI)
3
, mainly financed by Greek pension funds, 
state and local organizations, Universities and private bondholders (Bevan, 2012), 
the debt continues to rise. From € 303.5 billion or 157% of the GDP in 2012, it 
soared to € 328 billion or about 188,9% of the GDP by the end 2014. And according 
to IMF recent forecasts, it will jump to 196,9% in 2015 and to 206,6% in 2016. As 
shown in Histogram 4, the debt as a percentage of the GDP, grew impressively after 
the year 2008. From the same Histogram 4, the widely said hypothesis that, the 
heavy Greek debt is basically inherited from the past and especially from the 80s, is 
                                                 
3 The euro zone countries in their session of 21/8/2011, decided the implementation in Greece of  the 
so-called Private Sector Involvement (P.S.I ), which implies payments for the public debt with inflows 
from the private sector ( bonds belonging to Social Security and Public Organizations, Local 
Government, Universities, private bondholders etc). The term PSI has been firstly used for the 
restructuring of the public debts of Russia, Turkey, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil.   
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proven to be a big myth. It is evident that the debt made a big jamb after the year 
2008.  
 
Histogram 3. GDP growth 2008-2014, Greece, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland 
 
 
       
Moreover, the debts of private loans are also increasing dramatically. More than one 
in two businesses fail to service their loans, tax and insurance obligations. Overall 
arrears to the IRS are growing sharply and projected to surpass 100 billion by the 
end of 2015. More than half of thetotal of 5.8 million taxpayers owe to the IRS. 
Continuously expanding is the number of uninsured citizens and entrepreneurs. The 
pension funds, wounded with the haircut of their reserves from the PSI in 2011, are 
sinking (Bevan 2012). Their deficits are growing sharply and this  results to huge 
cuts in all kind of pensions. The economy is drying up and inflation moves with a 
negative sign of -1,4% in  2014 and of 0,5% in 2015( Ministry of the Economy, 
Budget Draft 2016) and this, creates conditions of permanent recession. In general, 
most indicators of the economy (GDP, unemployment, inflation, balance of 
payments, investments, industrial production, construction, etc), move with a 
monotonous downward trend (The World Bank Factbook, 2015, IMF Economic 
Outlook,2015, ELSTAT).    
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Histogram 4. Evolution of the Greek debt as a percentage of the GDP, 1970-2016 
 
 
Source: Histograme based on data of Eurostat and the European Comission 
 
Histogram 5. GDP forecasts according to the 1
st
 and the 2
nd
 programmed and actual 
results 
 
 
Source: Bruegel, Darvas (2015), Chionis ( 2015) 
         
Every year, the Greek government, the European Commission, the IMF, announce 
optimistic forecasts for the future trends of the Greek economy. These forecasts, also 
called by government officials as “the success story”, are always refuted in the end. 
The IMF accepted that it was wrong with its initial predictions concerning mainly 
the country’s multiplier (I.M.F., 2013, Spiegel & Harding, 2013, Blanchard, 2015). 
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Yet, the lesson was not learned. New even more extreme austerity policies, the so 
called “Third Memorandum” have been agreed in July 2015, under the notion that 
there is no alternative (TINA)
4
. This is applied currently, at a time when the total 
economic turnover is declining sharply with no real hopes for a strong adverse 
course.  Structural reforms implied with the present strict monetary and austerity 
policies, create deep human pain but not important economic gains
5
. As proven by a 
special OECD study, overall potential GDP gain from undertaking the full range of 
structural reforms, might come close to 10% at a 10-year horizon, or 1% per year 
(Bouis and Duval 2011). Under these circumstances, there is no hope that the 
country will manage to get out of the deep recession trap. At least 10% of the Greek 
GDP per year is necessary for payments of the country’s enormous debt. (Nikas, 
2015)
6
 Moreover, in accordance with the Okun‘s law, there is a need of at least 2,5%  
GDP growth per year, so as to reduce unemployment at  1%. (Okum, 1965 and 
1972)
7
. Therefore, in order to enter into a phase of employment stabilization and 
growth, an overall annual GDP of over 12% is needed. The chance for this to happen 
in the visible future is something like a science fiction scenario. The Modern Greek 
Tragedy has no end. 
 
The extreme recession policies, the huge levels of unemployment, the excessive 
compression of labour rewards and of pensions, are both inhumane and uneconomic. 
They lead to a large drop of domestic demand and to social uprising, with dangerous 
economic and social consequences.  Recession creates more recession lowers the 
business circle and the tax base. Poverty creates more poverty, misery, hate and 
upheaval. Loans lead to more loans and dependency – a perpetual cycle8. Mainly due 
to the overvalued euro, the lack of currency liquidity and the high interest rates of 
loans for business transactions, the country’s poor competitiveness is dying.  
Recession cannot be beaten with more recession policies, an overvalued currency 
and without a generous development plan (Krugman, 2012). Over the long term, this 
is burdensome to all, even for Greece’s lenders.  These policies are totally wrong. 
They are not the outcome of logic. And common logic is what we need today.  
 
                                                 
4 The famous slogan "There is no alternative" (TINA), was used by Margaret Thatcher to imply that, 
despite capitalism's problems, "there is no alternative" to it as an economic system, and that 
neoliberalism must push back against socialism. The phrase became something of a rallying statement   
in favourur of free markets, free trade, and capitalist globalization, with Thatcher and her followers 
believing that it is the only way which modern societies can advance themselves. 
5 Dani Rodrik (2015b) briefly describes structural reforms as improvements in regulation and 
institutions to enhance efficiency with which markets operate, reducing transaction costs of market 
activity,product and service markets: licensing fees and other costs, labour markets: hiring/firing costs, 
reducing entry barriers, eliminating monopolies,enhancing role of private sector over government, 
improved public sector administration, e.g., tax collection, rule of law 
6 Angela Merkel in August 2015 said that there is a need of 15% of the Greek GDP per year for the 
country’s debt obligations. Yet, 10% has been accepted for the same cause for the period until 2022. 
7 The Okun's Law, generally acceptable by forecasters as a tool for short-run trend analysis, notes that, 
a real GDP growth of 2-3% results to 1% decline in the rate of cyclical unemployment. 
8 Menandros an ancient Greek philosopher has said that ,”loans make slaves the human beings”. 
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2. Greece and the euro zone at the bottom of the world growth 
 
On the basis of the GDP growth, the euro zone stands today at the bottom of the 
world economic trends. This is shown outstandingly by the Histogram 6 presented 
here and more analytically, in table 1, both based on own elaboration of World Bank 
data (The Global Outlook, 2015). Between 2010-2014, the Greek economy 
witnessed an average annual GDP decline of -4,6%. This misery road was followed 
by the so-called GIPSI countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland), their 
annual average decline standing at -1,06% during the same years. The annual 
average growth of all the euro zone countries was only 0,63%, of the non-euro zone 
countries was 1,27%  and of  the E.U. on the whole,  1,01%. Even Germany, the 
economic engine and political leader of the euro zone, shows a poor average GDP 
growth   of 1,68%, during the same period. Also disappointing are the cases of the 
Netherlands (0,28%), Finland ( 0,56%),  France (1,04%),  Belgium ( 1,12%)  Austria 
(1,28%).  
 
During these five years that we study here (2010-2014), the average annual growth 
of all countries internationally including the E.U., was 3,62% and of all the countries 
internationally, with the exception of the euro zone, was 4,09%. Such a growth gap 
will be continued in the near future, as valid forecasts indicate and are presented in 
Table 2 here. It is more than evident that, the euro zone and especially the GIPSI, 
follow and will follow, a misery queue in the global economic growth race. What are 
the basic reasons for such a crucial finding that is a crucial question?      
 
Histogram 6. Average Annual Growth of GDP in Greece, the GIPSI, the euro zone 
and the rest of the world 
 
 
Source: World Bank, The Global Outlook, 2015. Author’s elaboration of analytical data of 
all countries internationally. Latvia and Lithuania have not been included in the above 
calculations as euro zone countries, because they entered in the euro area in 2014 and 2015 
respectively. The so-called GIPSI are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. 
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Most of the faster growing countries, enforce an economic strategy that inherits 
controlled currency devaluations. They follow the Chinese example of implementing 
soft monetary policies, in the light of the existence of an underground currency wars 
in present times (Richards 2012, Rousseff 2011), mainly between the dollar, the euro 
and the yen. 
 
Table 1. Average annual growth of all world countries between 2010 - 2014 
 
COUNTRIES GDP Growth 
 NEGATIVE GROWTH 
Central African Republic/ Greece -4,92/-4,8 
Bermuda/ Andorra/ Barbados -3,175/-3/-2,8 
Puerto Rico/ Cyprus/ Yemen, Rep./ Croatia -1,975/-1,68/-1,275/-1,1 
Portugal/ St. Lucia/ Italy/ Spain -0,92/-0,68/-0,52/-0,5 
Antigua and Barbuda/ St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines/ Equatorial Guinea -0,36/-0,28/-0,2 
 
GROWTH BETWEEN 0-
2% 
Slovenia/ Dominica/ Micronesia, Fed. Sts./ The 
Netherlands 0,16/0,22/0,25/0,28 
Serbia/ Trinidad and Tobago 0,36/0,425 
Denmark/ Jamaica/ Finland/ Ukraine 0,54/0,55/0,56/0,56 
Grenada/ Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,6/0,7 
South Sudan/ Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Czech 
Republic 0,82/0,84/0,96 
France/ Bahamas,  1,04/1,06 
Belgium/ Venezuela, RB/ Sudan 1,12/1,12/1,14 
Bulgaria/ Samoa/ Iceland/ Hungary/ Austria 1,2/1,2/1,22/1,24/1,28 
Romania/ Ireland/ Norway/ St. Kitts and Nevis 1,42/1,44/1,44/1,48 
Japan/ Montenegro/ Vanuatu 1,5/1,6/1,65 
United Kingdom/ Tuvalu/ El Salvador 1,7/1,825/1,84 
Switzerland/ Germany/ Haiti/ Libya 1,95/1,96/1,96/1,96 
 
GROWTH BETWEEN 2-
4% 
Tonga/ Madagascar/ Cabo Verde/ New Zealand/ 
Brunei Darussalam 2,024/2,04/2,06/2,075/2,08 
Honduras/ Kiribati/ United States/ Albania/ 
Swaziland 2,12/2,2/2,2/2,22/2,24 
Guinea/ FYROM/ Luxembourg 2,34/2,34/2,375 
Sweden/ South Africa/ Malta/ Tunisia 2,4/2,42/2,425/2,475 
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Gambia, / Canada/ Slovak Republic 2,54/2,56/2,58 
Australia/ Belize/ Egypt, Jordan/ Latvia/ Cuba 2,6/2,675/2,68, 2,7/2,7/2,7,25 
Guinea-Bissau/ Russian Federation/ Comoros/ Fiji 2,8/2,82/2,86/2,96 
Azerbaijan/ Lebanon/ Poland/ Brazil/ Algeria/ 
Mexico 3/3,02/3,08/3,22/3,32/3,32 
Marshall Islands/ Senegal/ Mali 3,45/3,46/3,48 
Belarus/ Pakistan/ Lithuania 3,52/3,52/3,54 
Guatemala/ Mauritius/ Morocco/ Oman 3,6/3,6/3,66/3,675 
Korea, Rep./ Hong Kong SAR, China/ West Bank 
and Gaza 3,74/3,78/3,78 
Israel/ Kuwait/ Estonia, Bahrain/ Kyrgyz Republic 3,8/3,825/3,84, 3,96/3,98 
 
GROWTH BETWEEN 4-
6% 
United Arab Emirates/ Suriname/ Palau/ Eritrea 4/4,1/4,14/4,18 
Armenia/ Burundi/ Costa Rica/ Sao Tome and 
Principe 4,2/4,26/4,32/4,32 
Argentina/ Benin/ Nepal 4,42/4,46/4,48 
Angola/ Chile/ Djibouti 4,64/4,64/4,68 
Cameroon/ Lesotho/ Guyana/ Malawi/ Nicaragua 4,7/4,7/4,72/4,72/4,74 
Colombia/ Thailand/ Uruguay 4,82/4,84/4,98 
Ecuador/ Dominican Republic/ Congo, Rep. 5/5,16/5,18 
Namibia/ Togo/ Saudi Arabia 5,2/5,202/5,28 
Cote d'Ivoire/ Bolivia/ Moldova 5,3/5,34/5,36 
Uganda/ Turkey/ Mauritania/ Georgia 5,42/5,44/5,46/5,56 
Nigeria/ Gabon/ Malaysia 5,74/5,76/5,78 
Indonesia/ Solomon Islands/ Peru/ Seychelles/ 
Vietnam 5,8/5,8/5,84/5,84/5,84 
 GROWTH BETWEEN 6-8 
Kazakhstan/ Kenya/ Iraq 6,02/6,02/6,06 
Bangladesh/ Philippines/ Liberia 6,14/6,28/6,3 
Burkina Faso/ Singapore/ Afghanistan 6,42/6,42/6,56 
Bhutan/ Botswana/ Tanzania/ Niger 6,6/6,62/6,7/6,8 
Cambodia/ Maldives/ Paraguay 6,96/6,96/6,96 
Tajikistan/ Chad/ Rwanda 7,1/7,12/7,14 
Mozambique/ Zambia/ India 7,2/7,2/7,26 
Sri Lanka/ Congo, Dem. Rep. 7,42/7,74 
 
GROWTH BETWEEN 8-
10% 
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Papua New Guinea/ Lao PDR/ Uzbekistan 8/8,1/8,22 
Panama/ Zimbabwe/ Myanmar 8,3/8,32/8,35 
Ghana/ China/ Timor-Leste , Qatar 8,54/8,6/8,68, 9,66 
 
GROWTH FROM 10% & 
MORE 
Ethiopia/ Sierra Leone 10,56/10,72 
Mongolia/ Turkmenistan, Macao SAR, China 11,08/11,1, 13,66 
Source: Data from World Bank, The Global Outlook, 2015 
Note: Euro zone countries, E.U.not euro zone countries 
 
The USA, Japan, Switzerland, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Island, Turkey, 
Ethiopia, South Africa, Nigeria, and almost all developing countries in different time 
and ways, have devalued their currencies in order to gain competitiveness, improve 
exports and decrease trade deficits. Argentina has posted impressive rates of 
economic growth after the uncoupling of the pesos from the US dollar and its 
devaluation in January 2002 (Cohen, 2011). In Japan, South Korea and China, it is 
noted that, “the skilful use of protective tariffs, currency manipulation, and 
government ownership and subsidies has produced economic miracles”.                       
(Rodrik, 2013).These facts and not only, suggest that despite leaving the ‘security’ 
of a fixed exchange rate, the economy can recover after abolishing a currency union.  
 
It is argued that, a nation's exchange rate is the single most important price in its 
economy; it will influence the entire range of individual prices, imports and exports, 
and even the level of economic activity (Volcker and Gyohtten 1993). In the 
underground currency wars of the present days, Greece has surrendered its ability for 
currency control to Berlin, whose main concern is the strengthening of the euro, in 
an effort to verify the German economic and political supremacy. Yet, Germany and 
it’s nearby euro zone countries are also not doing very well in terms of economic 
growth, as shown above. It may be argued that, the virus of stagnation from the 
south invades the north. Or is it the euro in itself, a basic cause of the illness? 
 
Blame the euro and not only 
 
The euro maybe was an impressive idea in theory as an optimal currency area 
(Mundell 1961), but in   real life, it has been a heavy burden. Nowadays, seven years 
after the beginning of the crisis, the majority of the developed and developing world 
has gotten back on their feet. Only the euro zone stagnates and it will continue to do 
so as indicated above. A basic question arises: why is this happening?   
 
According to our view, this is mainly due to the overvalued euro without the 
existence of a fair political umbrella, in combination with and the strict monetarist 
and austerity policies imposed by Berlin. The malpractices of the non controlled 
international markets, the existence of tax paradises, are also to blame for the world 
economic crises that have a stronger effect upon weak economies such as that of 
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Greece. In an indirect way, the latter also pays the price of the underground currency 
war between the dollar, the euro and the yen. The overvalued euro in particular, puts 
a heavy burden upon the country’s economic competitiveness. It is a costume that 
does not fit the Greek economy, which is mainly based on tourism that requires a 
labour-intensive production process. Labour costs can not be compressed below a 
certain level, so that the total production costs will be lower or equal to that of our 
competitors in the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea. Accusations that the Greeks 
do not work hard are a myth. Working hours in Greece are the highest in Europe as 
shown in the Histogram 7.  Yet, the country’s international competitiveness is law 
and this is due to other reasons as we try to prove here.  
 
The deadlocks of the painful agreement for the third memorandum will soon be seen 
in the upcoming economic thunderstorm, the spiral of recession, the increase in 
unemployment, the brutal reduction of wages and pensions, the further fall of GDP 
and the increase of the debt. The always renewed fatal economic forecasts, simply 
postpone the explosion of the deadlock. Basic economics in theory and in practice 
are being depreciated (Negreponti-Delivani, 2014). One wonders if there is any 
serious economist, neoliberal, not to mention, Keynesian and/or radical that, may 
support the possibility of an economic recovery under deep recession policies and 
the existence of a hard currency such as the euro. So far as we   know, there is no 
such a case in real life, anytime, anywhere. Trapped under Berlin’s political prison 
and the euro zone fetish, Greece continuous to follow its tragic road on the grounds 
that there is no alternative. Yet, in democracies there are no dead ends. If an 
economic policy is proven to be wrong and/or catastrophic, the best alternative is to 
change it. 
 
Table 2. World Bank Forecasts for Annual Growth of the GDP in selected areas and 
countries 
 2015f 2016f 2017f 
REAL GDP1    
World 2.8 3.3 3.2 
High income 2.0 2.4 2.2 
United States 2.7 2.8 2.4 
Euro Area 1.5 1.8 1.69 
Japan 1.1 1.7 1.2 
                                                 
9 The European Commission, in aν official statement by the end of October 2015, foresee  that, in  the 
euro zone area, the GDP growth will be 1,6% in 2015, 1,8% in 2016 and 1,9% in 2017. For Greece, 
according to the E.C. there will be a decline of the GDP at a level of -1,4 in 2015 and of -1,3% in 2016. 
The Greek government in its budget draft for the year 2016, predicts a GDP decline of -2,3% for 2015 
and of  -1,3% for 2016.   
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United Kingdom 2.6 2.6 2.2 
Russia -2.7 0.7 2.5 
Developing 
countries 
4.4 5.2 5.4 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
6.7 6.7 6.6 
China 7.1 7.0 6.9 
 
Histogram 7. Working hours around the world 
 
 
    
The friendly Grexit as the best alternative 
 
As things stand today and given the present international geopolitical balance, the 
friendly Grexit, temporary or permanent, is the proper alternative for Greece. This 
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implies a controlled bankruptcy, suspension of debt payments and negotiations for 
cutting and extending its repayment period. During the initial negotiation days, the 
government must be ready to provide liquidity to the economy through the issuing of 
non-interest state bonds at a ratio of 1: 1 in relation to the euro. Existing capital 
controls imposed by the euro zone and the recent widespread transactions with 
electronic   money through the banks, could be used properly. By possessing the 
necessary domestic currency liquidity, the   Greek government will be in a better 
negotiation position for the friendly Grexit, the necessary cut of the debt and the 
extension of its repayment period.  
 
The next step will be the issuing of the new drachma devaluated at 25-30% in 
relation to the euro, as a necessary precondition for regaining the lost 
competitiveness of the economy. In order to avoid the dangers of hyperinflation, the 
amount of new drachma produced, must not exceed a certain level of the M2
10
. The 
euro may continue to be used as a parallel currency for a period decided in 
accordance with the result of negotiations and economic trends.  The necessary 
imports for fuels and raw materials can be initially immunized by existing foreign 
reserves and transnational agreements and soon, with the strong inflow of foreign 
exchange from the expected increase in exports and tourism. In any case, the 
widespread fears for an initial vacuum of imported necessary goods does not exist, 
since at present, the total balance of payments for goods and services has shown a 
surplus of 1,8 billion euro in the year 2013 (The Minister of The Bank of Greece 
Report, 2014, page 115 ). Capital controls could contribute to improving the balance 
of payments, since through them it is possible to facilitate exports and reduce 
imports of non-essential luxury goods. The black economy and illegal work will be 
limited necessarily. Only legal immigrants could export a certain amount of taxpayer 
exchange and this alone, will prevent the inflow of excess number of economic 
immigrants without legal residence and work permit.          
 
Internal economic transactions may supported by the issuing of the national 
currency.  In the same way, the banks may be re-capitalised and provide the 
desperately needed liquidity to the economy. Low and medium incomes may be 
increased gradually, following labour productivity and GDP growth trends. 
Government spending restrictions, the combat of corruption, impunity, bureaucracy, 
tax evasion and the strengthening of productive investments, are also necessary. The 
Greek economy must be cleared from the pathetic syndrome of the “import country” 
that depends upon loans, reactivate its production basis, try to consume no more than 
                                                 
10 The M2 is briefly defined as the measure of money supply that includes cash and 
checking deposits (M1) as well as near money. “Near money" in M2, includes savings deposits, money 
market mutual funds and other time deposits, which are less liquid and not as suitable as exchange 
mediums but can be quickly converted into cash or checking deposits. 
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it produces, abolish malpractices of the past and make a healthy new beginning 
towards the future.  
 
Epilogue 
 
The friendly Grexit, temporary or permanent, is attacked by several politicians, 
activists and analysts in Greece on the grounds that, it is proposed by our big 
“enemy”, the German Minister of economics Wolfgang Schäuble. These attacks are 
made without examining the fact that, the proposal is made by the Berlin 
government for reasons beyond Greece. According to the same proposal, which is 
certainly negotiable for improvements, with a friendly temporary and/or permanent 
Grexit, the country will be endowed with 50 million euro and the drachma will be 
guaranteed by the European Central Bank. In this case, Greece will not be subject to 
the strict rules of the euro zone and it may pursue a targeted growth policy with the 
adoption of the national currency. The present German government for its own 
reasons related to the needs of   strengthening the euro in international markets 
against the USA dollar, will not go away from its present harsh position regarding 
Greece as member of the euro zone. If the strict euro zone rules will be relaxed for 
Greece, then the same will be happen as a domino for other countries, resulting in 
the collapse of the Berlin’s policy. If you want the 'euro at any price ", you will 
suffer all the sacrifices imposed by the rules of the euro zone, the Berlin says.  
 
At present, in the days of the Modern Greek Tragedy, we must leave behind the 
obsessions, the hook, the absurdity of the "euro at all costs" that goes hand in hand 
with the barbaric Memorandum. After learning the lessons from our mistakes of the 
past, the stubborn insistence of being a member of the euro zone deadlock is a fatal 
illusion. Nor is there any solution by the ultra left "all or nothing" obsessions which 
shift the termination of the Greek tragedy in infinite future. The friendly Grexit must 
and will come sooner or later.  
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